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Philosophical Perspectives on  
Fictional Characters
Paisley Livingston and Andrea Sauchelli
In what Fred Crews calls “duty free interdisciplinarity,” scholars borrow an idea from another field and slip it across the border into their home discipline, where it is misrepresented as the state 
of the art in the source field.1 We aim to avoid this kind of error in the 
following selective survey of philosophical perspectives on fiction and 
fictional characters. Although we cannot offer a comprehensive historical 
overview, we describe a number of different positions that have been 
central to contemporary philosophical debates. We pass over various 
approaches and topics that have figured prominently in literary theory, 
and instead emphasize work that is less likely to be familiar to literary 
scholars. Our focus here is on what can be called the more fundamental 
issues, that is, questions about the very nature of fictional characters 
and the basis of our knowledge of them. We take it that these issues 
are logically distinct from, but of direct relevance to, a number of other 
fascinating topics, including questions about the feelings or emotions 
that are and are not appropriate to a reader’s experience of persons 
represented in a work of fiction, or the question of whether and how 
genuine knowledge is to be had from the experience of characters and 
their doings in fictions. 
We do not pretend to be neutral about the positions surveyed in what 
follows, and shall refrain from misrepresenting our opinions as the object 
of a philosophical consensus. It is our hope that literary scholars may 
find some of these ideas insightful and useful, and indeed, we aim to 
establish that the philosophers whose works we discuss have presented 
a number of arguments and positions that are directly relevant to de-
bates in literary studies. We hasten to add, however, that this is not a 
situation where an authoritative theory can be imported from one field 
into another. Instead, it should be acknowledged that topics surround-
ing fictional characters have proved to be an important challenge to 
a number of sophisticated theories in metaphysics and the philosophy 
of language and mind. 
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Here is a brief outline of the paper. We begin by setting forth a basic 
and central question about fictional characters and survey some of the 
main ways of trying to answer this question. We start with the broad 
family of realist approaches and discuss some of its members. The 
premise shared by such approaches is that, at least in some cases, claims 
about fictional characters refer to something real and can be right or 
wrong. Having discussed realist approaches we then turn to “irrealist” 
approaches. The basic orientation of all such approaches is provided 
by the thought that fictional characters are in some sense a figment of 
the human imagination. This family of views has its attractions, but faces 
problems as well. Those who think the problems outweigh the advantages 
have sought to find a way out of the realist/irrealist dilemma, and one 
family of views, based on work by Alexius Meinong, is discussed. We 
turn, finally, to issues related to the distinction between characters and 
other aspects of the content of fictions, including the relation between 
a literary concept of character and positions on personality theory in 
psychology. In a brief conclusion we sketch our preferred stance on the 
issues and positions canvassed in the paper.
A Challenge to Philosophy
Consider the following passage, which can be located in chapter 49 
of any good edition of William Makepeace Thackeray’s Vanity Fair: A 
Novel Without a Hero:
“I will do anything that may give pleasure to my Lord Steyne or to you,” said 
Rebecca, sincerely grateful, and seating herself at the piano, began to sing.
She sang religious songs of Mozart, which had been early favourites of Lady 
Steyne, and with such sweetness and tenderness that the lady lingering round the 
piano, sate down by its side, and listened until the tears rolled down her eyes.2
With regard to this passage, it seems right to say that it is true in the 
fiction that Lady Steyne is moved by Rebecca’s talented performance 
of some of the Lady’s favorite songs by Mozart. Yet what makes this the 
case? The philosophical challenge is to provide a principled account 
that can adequately explain, not only cases like this simple paraphrase, 
but the surprising variety of utterances about fiction, which includes 
detailed interpretations of a work’s content, comparisons between dif-
ferent fictions (for example, “Rebecca Sharp is more evil than Barry 
Lyndon”), existential statements (“There is no real Rebecca Sharp”), 
critical or metafictional claims (“Rebecca Sharp is a character in Vanity 
Fair”), and generalizations about the nature of fictional characters (“All 
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fictional characters are abstract objects”). As we show in more detail in 
what follows, these sample statements represent the striking variety of 
the discourse about fictional characters, and it turns out that an account 
or theory that can seem perfectly suited to dealing with one of these 
types of statements may not work well at all in an attempt to explicate 
some of the other kinds. 
This most basic philosophical challenge concerning fictional char-
acters can be couched as a question regarding the truth conditions of 
the various kinds of statements about fictions. In other words, what, if 
anything, could make a given statement about a fictional character right 
or wrong? A brief clarification of how that question may be articulated 
more fully is in order. Truth, we take it, is best characterized as relational. 
One way to put this is to say, using David Armstrong’s influential idiom, 
that truth requires not only a truth-bearer, or something that has the 
property of being true, but also a truth-maker.3 What motivates this ap-
proach to the question of truth is the insight that the word “truth” does 
not in general refer to some kind of simple and independent entity or 
substance (as in Truth with a capital “t”). Instead, it is more plausible 
to think of truth as a feature that something like a belief or a statement 
can have or fail to have. Plausible truth-bearers, then, include statements, 
beliefs, propositions, and thoughts. Yet in the case of empirical beliefs 
or statements, a truth-bearer is true or false, not independently, but only 
in relation to what it is about. For example, the bare fact that someone 
believes himself healthy does not make this belief true or false. The 
belief is about a physical condition that either does or does not obtain. 
Or if someone asserts that Rebecca Sharp in Vanity Fair is a Martian 
in disguise, the fact that such an assertion has been made does not in 
itself make it correct. Truth, then, is understood as a relation between 
a truth-bearer and a truth-maker (or more traditionally, as a correlation 
between a proposition and a fact).
With these assumptions in mind, consider the statement, “Mozart 
wrote some religious songs.” Here the truth-maker could be the event 
of Mozart’s writing songs such as “O Gottes Lamm,” since it is the actual 
occurrence of such an event that makes the statement true. Yet what is 
the truth-maker in the case of the above-cited sentence to the effect that 
Lady Steyne was moved by Rebecca Sharp’s performance of songs by 
Mozart? If neither Rebecca Sharp nor Lady Steyne ever existed, it would 
seem that there are no truth-makers for this sentence. Is it not simply 
false, then, to say that Rebecca Sharp’s performance moved Lady Steyne 
to tears? Yet such a conclusion is hardly appealing, at least for those of 
us who are strongly inclined to think that some statements about what 
happens in the fiction are true, while others are not.4 What, if anything, 
makes them true or false?
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The problem is framed even more sharply for the many contemporary 
philosophers who have espoused a general, “referentialist” theory of the 
meaning of names, according to which the semantic contribution of a 
name is nothing other than its referent (for example, the name “Mozart” 
refers to Mozart, and its contribution to the meaning of the sentence 
“Mozart wrote religious songs” is just Mozart, the real person).5 It could 
seem to follow from this account that sentences containing fictional or 
“empty” names are not meaningful (and false), but devoid of meaning. 
Yet such an unsettling conclusion is hard to square with the fact that 
people use such sentences in meaningful conversations about the works 
of fiction they have experienced, and would appear to be able to agree 
and disagree over the fictional characterizations in them (for example, 
as when they readily concur that Mira Nair’s character named “Rebecca 
Sharp” is quite different from the character in Thackeray who bears the 
lexically identical name).
The philosophical challenge, then, is to say how statements about 
fiction can be meaningful and, in some cases, true. This is of course 
not the only important philosophical question that arises with regard to 
fictional characters, but it is the central one in much of the contemporary 
philosophical literature on the topic, and as was announced above, in 
what follows our primary concern will be to survey some of the main 
responses to this challenge.
Fictional Characters as Abstract Objects or Artifacts
Realists about fictional characters hold that fictional characters actu-
ally exist in a mind-independent manner and have determinate prop-
erties that can make certain statements about them true or false. So 
the truth-makers for statements and beliefs about fictional characters 
would be actual beings of some sort. Yet this line of thought is not very 
promising if it is interpreted as the idea that every work of fiction is a 
fiction à clef referring to specific, real-world persons. There is no good 
reason to think that Thackeray had any one, actual person in mind in 
writing about Rebecca Sharp, or that readers of his novel are supposed 
to be thinking about and referring to that person. The statement, “Re-
becca Sharp is just a fictional character and never really existed” seems 
uncontroversially correct. How, then, could any realist approach be 
squared with this fact? 
One option, which has appealed to some literary theorists, is to hold 
that fictional characters are the denizens of possible worlds, while also 
holding that possible worlds exist.6 Very briefly, philosophizing about 
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possible worlds finds its point of departure in the fact that we tend to 
talk and think, not only about what (we think) is actually the case, but 
also about what could or could not happen. For example, “If you do 
not pass the exam, you will fail the course” expresses a train of thought 
familiar to all teachers. So what are we talking about when we use coun-
terfactual utterances and refer to nonactual states of affairs? “Possible 
worlds” is one way of trying to reply to that question. Some philosophers, 
including David K. Lewis, have argued for the concrete reality of all 
possible worlds. What is merely possible from the standpoint of our 
actual world could be, or perhaps even is, actual at some other world. 
And if there are such possible worlds, maybe what a fiction describes is 
a world of this sort, including its denizens. The tempting thought, then, 
is that what makes some statements about fictions true is the possible 
world this fiction is about. There are, however, some basic objections 
to this entire approach, and we shall briefly evoke some of them in the 
next paragraph.
It must be acknowledged, first of all, that as a given work of fiction 
refers at best to a set of possible worlds, there is no simple one-to-one 
mapping of fictional characters onto an individual person existing in 
possible worlds.7 Why would that be so? A world is complete in the fol-
lowing sense: for any thought or proposition, it is either the case that 
this proposition is true in that world or that it is false. A world is in this 
respect determinate, which is not to say that anybody can know every-
thing about it. In contrast to this basic assumption about worlds, the 
domain or states of affairs evoked or represented by a work of fiction is 
not complete in this sense. As Roman Ingarden famously argued, there 
are “spots of indeterminacy” even for the most attentive reader who 
keeps everything in the text vividly in mind.8 For example, there is the 
world where Becky sang n songs by Mozart, the world where she sang 
n+1 songs, the world where she wore n pieces of jewelry when she sang 
Mozart songs, the world where she wore n+1 pieces of jewelry on that 
occasion, and so on. It follows that if we think of fictions as referring to 
possible worlds, Rebecca Sharp is not just one possible person inhabiting 
one possible world, but a set of possible persons in an infinity of possible 
worlds. Statements about the Thackeray character by that name would 
be true, then, of all of the persons living in all of the possible worlds 
where the name picks out someone corresponding to the type of person 
represented by the descriptions of her in Thackeray’s work. For many 
philosophers, this is enough to show that this entire approach does not 
really provide an adequate elucidation of our ways of thinking about a 
fictional character, since we are often inclined to think of a character 
as one person or agent, and not a set of persons or agents. Sets, it may 
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be helpful to recall, are not concrete entities, but abstract objects. The 
property of being abstract, which is contrasted to the property of being 
concrete, is usually understood as the property of not being spatiotem-
porally located, though there are other ways of drawing the distinction.9 
At this point the most salient realist option is simply to accept this 
consequence. Fictional characters are thereby accepted into one’s 
ontology as a proper subset of the general category of abstract objects 
or types.10 The realist may have independent grounds for holding that 
abstract objects exist.11 Yet there is a major problem to be faced here. 
Traditionally, abstract objects have been thought of as eternal and not 
influenced by any interaction with concrete agents. According to this 
Platonist understanding of abstract objects, they can be discovered but 
not created by creatures located in space and time. However, this basic 
premise about the status of abstract entities or abstracta runs contrary to 
a deeply entrenched intuition about fictional characters, namely, that 
they are created in a specific context by a specific author (or group of 
collaborating authors). Although realism about abstract objects may 
have the virtue of justifying certain kinds of statements about fictional 
characters, it can be hard to accept the implication that Rebecca Sharp 
exists eternally and would have done so had the human species never 
evolved on the planet Earth.12 
Is there no other option for some kind of realist approach to fictional 
characters? Amie Thomasson is a contemporary philosopher who has 
argued that the traditional philosophical manner of sorting entities as 
abstract or concrete is not particularly enlightening. She proposes a dif-
ferent system of categories, and thus a different metaphysical picture, 
based in part on the idea of ontological dependence, where, roughly 
speaking, one item is ontologically dependent on another item just in 
case the nonexistence of the former implies the nonexistence of the 
latter.13 According to Thomasson, fictional characters such as Rebecca 
Sharp and Gregor Samsa should be classified as humanly created abstract 
artifacts.14 They are thereby recognized as sharing a common feature 
with other entities that are familiar parts of our sociocultural reality, 
such as nations, marriages, and laws: their very coming into existence 
depends on intentional acts of (allegedly) rational agents. They have all, 
so to speak, been “manufactured” by the creative intentions of rational 
beings, and that is why they are called “artifacts.” 
According to Thomasson, the identity conditions of a fictional char-
acter, that is, the conditions that determine when a particular character 
comes into existence, are specified by the practices of the actual “literary 
world” in which use is made of the “empty” name that supposedly refers 
to a fictional character. For example, the sentence ”Josef K. exists” is 
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true in case the name “Josef K.” is used with the intention to refer to a 
fictional character, and that intention is successfully expressed through 
some means that is recognizable as a part of an established literary prac-
tice. This condition is satisfied whenever the intentions of the author 
(or authors) of a work are in line with the beliefs and practices of those 
who deal competently with literary works. In short, what it takes to be a 
fictional character is determined by the practices of literary critics and 
authors. Given that the agent using a fictional name in creating a work 
of literature is ipso facto an author, he or she can be regarded as one 
of those individuals who regulate the existence conditions of fictional 
characters. Thomasson dubs this the “easy approach to ontology.” As 
long as the conditions of applicability of a proper name are satisfied, 
the name refers and the referent thus exists. 
One aspect of Thomasson’s sophisticated and well-developed theory 
is the thesis that fictional characters are rigidly historically dependent 
on the intentional acts of their creator(s). This means that in order to 
come into existence, a fictional character requires a specific act of cre-
ation. In other words, being created at a specific moment by a specific 
author is an essential feature of the character.15 A fictional character is 
also constantly and generically dependent on the existence of the literary 
work and of a community able to process information about it. These 
conditions provide criteria for establishing when a character ceases to 
exist: Lord Jim is a contingent being like us. Should all of the instances 
of the text of Joseph Conrad’s novel be destroyed and should there no 
longer be any agents capable of remembering or understanding the 
text, Lord Jim would no longer exist. 
Thomasson’s proposals are well worked out and carefully argued. They 
represent, in our view at least, a significant advance in relation to the idea 
that one can simply pull a world or a set of worlds out of a given work 
of fiction, and in so doing, come up with a cast of fictional characters. 
Yet there are some objections that can be raised to Thomasson’s views, 
and we will briefly set forth two kinds of objections in what follows.
One kind of objection to this proposal targets the postulated link be-
tween metaphysical theses (in the sense of basic claims about the nature 
and ontological status of various entities) and the “world” of literary 
practices. Thomasson allows that with regard to many questions about 
the individuation of characters, literary practice is vague and indecisive, 
but her contention is that with regard to many other questions, literary 
practice is stable and coherent.16 Our objection to this approach can be 
couched in both a bold and more cautious form. The bold version denies 
that the literary practices to which the philosopher defers in fact form 
such a system. As is to be expected in a domain where experimentation 
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and innovation are endemic, there is no stable consensus amongst the 
(competent) practitioners, whose heterogeneous activities and attitudes 
involve different and even contradictory standards.17 In a more cautious 
version, the objection runs as follows: while it could be the case that 
there is a subtending and stable system of competent practices consti-
tutive of meaning and reference in literary fictions, the onus is on the 
philosopher to establish that this is indeed the case, and to explain why 
this should be so. Thomasson has not in fact shouldered this burden. 
This does not entail, however, that it cannot be done, and indeed, it 
is only an extreme species of skepticism that denies that many of the 
statements made about literary characters have cogent and justifiable 
answers. Yet even if there is demonstrable convergence on certain types 
of claims amongst reasonable, well-informed readers, the question of 
what makes this convergence competent, reasonable, and justifiable re-
mains. More succinctly, the objection challenges the apparent assumption 
that a subset of the critical discourse about literature is self-grounding 
or in some obvious way warranted, and thus capable of providing an 
uncontroversial ground for metaphysical contentions about the nature 
and modes of existence of some category of entities. 
A second objection to Thomasson’s view targets the fact that on her 
account, a character is an abstract artifact. The complaint is that abstract 
artifact theories cannot always provide a straightforward account of our 
statements about fiction. Even though we may be inclined to accept 
some arguments to the effect that our talk about fictional characters may 
involve reference to (or quantification over) abstracta, this does not imply 
that all our thoughts and statements involving fictional characters can 
be analyzed straightforwardly in this way. In particular, an attribution 
of a property to a fictional individual cannot always be analyzed as a 
straightforward attribution of a property to an abstract object. Such an 
analysis yields silly metaphysical mistakes. For example, in a translation 
of Albert Camus’s L’étranger we find the following sentences: “His name 
is Raymond Sintès. He’s a little on the short side, with broad shoulders 
and a nose like a boxer’s.”18 What can be ruled out is that Camus and his 
readers are in the business of attributing the property of having broad 
shoulders to an abstract object, as abstract objects do not have shoulders 
(or bones, or blood, and, in general, are not composed of cells). It follows 
that claims within the context of a fiction cannot always be analyzed as 
straightforward attributions of a property to an abstract object.
Thomasson has proposed at least one way of dealing with this issue.19 
Namely, she would have us introduce a fictional operator (such as “in 
the fiction . . .”) to disambiguate the attribution of properties to the 
abstract object when it is taken as representing a fictional character in-
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side the context of the novel. This would help to mark off the specific 
part of our fictional discourse that requires abstract artifacts, such as 
metafictive ascriptions made by literary critics, or statements in which 
readers implicitly quantify over characters in their debates. This strikes 
us as an intuitively appealing move, but it is worth pointing out that it is 
not entirely unproblematic and raises a number of interesting questions. 
It is, moreover, a move characteristic of a rather different approach to 
fiction, namely, the prefix strategy, which is a topic to which we return 
in our next section.
Irrealism, Pretense, and Presupposition
The term “irrealist” can be used to single out a family of positions 
that converge on the thought that it is a mistake to postulate certain 
kinds of entities as the truth-makers for fictional discourse. There are 
several logically distinct reasons why one might be inclined to distrust 
such postulations. One is that there are strong, independent doubts 
about the existence of these sorts of entities (such as nominalist worries 
about abstract objects, or roughly, the idea that while there are particular 
thoughts and drawings of triangles, there is no independently existing 
abstract object to be referred to as “triangle”). Another kind of worry 
is that reference to these entities cannot really suffice to sort out our 
various statements about fiction, starting with “Sherlock Holmes does 
not exist,” and moving on to “Arthur Conan Doyle had Holmes die in 
‘The Final Problem’ but brought the character back to life years later 
in ‘The Adventure of the Empty House.’” 
One broad family of irrealist views is known as pretense theory. An 
influential example is Kendall L. Walton’s proposal that metaphysically 
dubious statements about fictional characters can be replaced by un-
objectionable claims about imagining or pretense. Walton’s basic idea 
is that works in the representational arts are to be understood in terms 
of props for games of make-believe. Children’s imaginative use of toys 
and objects in their games of make-believe are taken as the model for 
understanding the proper relation between works of fiction and those 
who engage with them. The function of the text of a novel, for example, 
is to regulate and direct the imaginative games of the audience. Such 
“props” in games of make-believe generate fictional truths and authorize 
or prescribe certain imaginings. A fictional truth is something true in 
such a game, where what this really means is that some kind of norm or 
prescription warrants that such-and-such is to be imagined in that game. 
As Walton puts it, “A proposition is fictional if it is to be imagined, if a 
story or other work of fiction prescribes imagining it.”20 
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While Walton claims that a philosophical analysis of the specificity 
of propositional imagining would be desirable, he concedes that such 
an analysis is out of reach. Very roughly, the core intuition is that to 
imagine some object or state of affairs is to engage in a kind of nonas-
sertive entertaining or considering based upon some prop, where such 
an attitude does not entail holding that thought to be true.21 There is, of 
course, much more to be said about the nature of imagining and how it 
is in various ways different from, yet related to, such mental operations 
as believing, conjecturing, and so on, but we will follow Walton in what 
follows in working with a fairly sketchy idea of imagining as nonassertive 
considering or entertaining in thought. 
With regard to the philosophical puzzle concerning the truth condi-
tions of earnest statements referring to fictional characters, Walton holds 
that no such entity as Sherlock Holmes is required for statements about 
the character in “The Final Solution” to be true. The use of the name 
”Sherlock Holmes” is to be understood as taking place inside pretense: 
the implicit writer or speaker of the sentences in the novel is pretending 
to refer to an entity and thus is not committed to its actual existence. 
Walton’s general scheme for dealing with fictional characters is that an 
assertion concerning fictional entities is true in case it is fictional, in 
the relevant authorized game of make-believe, that the agent making 
that assertion speaks truly. An apparent assertion about a fictional entity 
should be understood, then, as a move in a game of make-believe in 
which we pretend to give a true description of the world. 
Walton’s influential proposal rightly underscores the role of the imagi-
nation in the making and appreciation of works of fiction. If there are 
any significant theses that form the object of a strong consensus in this 
area of philosophy, one of them is that the attitude of imagining is es-
sential to the difference between works of fiction and other categories of 
works and utterances.22 It does not automatically follow from this point, 
however, that a pretense account can deal with claims about fictional 
characters that are made outside the pretense, such as “Sherlock Hol-
mes is a fictional character.” This is a statement that many of us would 
acknowledge as being straightforwardly true, and not true on the condi-
tion that we engage in some complicated rewording. Walton’s proposal, 
for example, is to say, with regard to such statements, that in making 
them we “acknowledge, while betraying the pretense, only that there is 
a work in whose authorized games so pretending is fictionally to refer 
successfully.”23 The relevant objection to this complicated rewording, as 
voiced by Peter Lamarque, is that Walton’s theory “extends pretence too 
widely” because it implies the presence of games of make-believe in cases 
where a literal interpretation “seems more intuitive.”24 More bluntly put, 
we don’t pretend that Conan Doyle invented a character named Sherlock 
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Holmes, we rightly believe that he did so, and the reason why such beliefs 
are true is that he really did create the character: the truth-maker is the 
events involved in Doyle’s creative activity.
Is it really true that Walton’s sophisticated approach cannot success-
fully account for the truth conditions of straightforward and uncontro-
versial metafictional statements? To get a better sense of the problem, 
note that if we mechanically apply the prefix strategy (appending the 
“it is fictional that . . .” clause before the relevant statements about the 
fictional characters), what we have previously identified as an intuitively 
true metafictional statement becomes: “It is fictional in Conan Doyle’s 
‘The Final Solution’ that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character.” 
This statement, however, reports an inference that the reader is in fact 
not prescribed to draw within the pretense. What the fictioneer invites 
us to imagine is that Holmes is a remarkably clever human being, not 
a fictional character. There are, of course, self-reflexive fictions that 
invite us to think of a fictional character as a fictional character, but an 
adequate theory must handle fictions where this is not the case as well 
as those where it is.25 
It should be apparent at this point in the discussion that each of the 
approaches surveyed so far is appealing in that it gets part of the story 
right, but that each of them runs into trouble when faced with other 
aspects of discourse about fictional characters. Is there no way to provide 
a more comprehensive account?
One such approach to the logic and semantics of fictional characters 
is Mark Sainsbury’s recent pluralistic proposal. As Sainsbury’s views on 
the matter are quite complex, we can only offer a brief and simplified 
sketch. Sainsbury argues that the supposed benefits of including exotic 
entities such as unreal persons within our ontology can be had without 
sacrificing a more sober and defensible ontology. He acknowledges that 
discourse about fiction is varied, and proposes that different strategies 
should be employed to deal with the different kinds of claims made 
about fiction. A cornerstone of Sainsbury’s strategy is a theory about 
fictional names called “Reference without Referents.”26 The basic idea 
is that empty names can make a semantic contribution to the proposi-
tions of which they are a part, despite the fact that they lack a referent. 
Unlike those who defend a standard referentialist account, Sainsbury 
claims that in general we associate referring expressions with certain ref-
erence conditions, rather than with the referent of the expression itself. 
For example, in the case of the name “Obama,” we have the following 
conditions: for all x (“Obama” refers to x if and only if x = Obama).27 
How does such an analysis help us with a simple sentence such as 
“Josef K. is a bank clerk”? Sainsbury identifies various options. The 
first option is to paraphrase the sentence in some way that makes it 
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turn out true and not problematic, that is, not committing us to the 
existence of exotic entities. The general idea behind this strategy is to 
claim that a problematic sentence is true but, despite its apparent on-
tological commitment, its truth conditions are equivalent to those of a 
nonproblematic sentence. For example, we can say that a sentence such 
as “Josef K. is a bank clerk” is true and that, despite its apparent com-
mitment to an exotic entity (Josef K.), this sentence can be paraphrased 
into another one, the truth conditions of which are not ontologically 
committing. The rationale behind this move is usually that the second 
(and unproblematic) sentence reveals the real hidden logical form of 
the previous one. For example, it is argued that the sentence “Josef K. 
is a bank clerk” includes, at a logical level, a noncommitting fictional 
operator: “According to the fiction, Josef K. is a bank clerk.” The two 
sentences are equivalent because the latter is taken to reveal the real 
logical form of the former.
A second option is to deny that this sentence is true, while adding 
that, although the sentence is literally false because there is no actual 
Josef K., we can still account for the idea that in some circumstances 
the sentence can be taken as true. The trick is to have recourse to the 
notion of presupposition. For example, we can say that when we take 
the sentence to be true, we should be understood as presupposing that 
the sentence is prefixed by an operator such as “according to Franz 
Kafka’s The Trial.” Or perhaps the presupposition is that Josef K. is a 
real person. Having recourse to the presupposition strategy allows us 
to remain neutral about the equivalence in truth conditions between 
the two sentences. Sainsbury notes that in conversational contexts our 
presuppositions do not always match what we actually believe. In the 
context of literary criticism, critics who discuss Josef K. can accept or 
presuppose that Josef K. is a real person, without, however, believing 
this to be true. They can do so for any number of reasons, such as at-
tempting to arrive at a better understanding of the character’s possible 
emotional states.28 Another strategy for dealing with claims about fiction 
is to treat them not as truth-evaluable; in the place of truth values or 
truth conditions, we adopt the notion of faithful-to-the-story.” Josef K. is 
a bank clerk” would turn out to be faithful to the story, but not literally 
true. What is and is not faithful to the story associated with a given work 
of fiction is, of course, a matter of great controversy, one that returns 
us, once more, to the basic problem of how the content of a fiction is 
determined.29 While there are certain advantages in adopting Sainsbury’s 
pluralistic approach, simplicity is not one of them. 
To sum this last section up, the irrealist approach captures important, 
well-entrenched ideas about the nature of fiction and fictional characters. 
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Yet this kind of approach would appear to run aground on the historical 
and cultural reality of created works and characters. This was the strength 
of the abstract artifact theory that recognizes such items as irreducibly 
real entities. Yet as we saw above, that very approach must at a certain 
point have recourse to the prefix strategy and to some idea of a special 
attitude, such as pretense or imagining, that governs certain statements 
about fictional characters. Sainsbury’s pluralistic approach has the virtue 
of inviting us to shift perspectives along with contexts so as to adopt vi-
able ways of talking about the contrasting aspects of fictions, yet we are 
left with the question of how these different perspectives and contexts 
fit together, as well as the deeper problem of offering something like 
a principled account of how the very content of a fiction, or in other 
words, what happens in the story, is determined at all. With his evoca-
tion of “authorized games of make-believe,” Walton implies that there is 
indeed a solution to that problem, but he in fact provides no principled 
account of how the distinction between authorized and unauthorized 
pretense is to be drawn and applied. The search for a comprehensive 
account continues.
Fictional Characters as Nonexistent Objects
Not all philosophers have been convinced that the options are ex-
hausted by a choice between believing and disbelieving in fictional 
entities, or between postulating or denying their existence. An early 
articulation of an alternative was Alexius Meinong’s contention that 
fictional characters figure amongst those items in the universe that lack 
the property of existence, but have a sort of being labelled Gegebenheit 
or givenness (and not merely a givenness in thought or experience).30 
According to this theory, when we say that Rebecca Sharp does not ex-
ist, we are right, but we can coherently add, without the “dodges” of 
paraphrase, prefix, or presupposition, that she has musical talent and 
manages to bring Lady Steyne to tears. 
Meinongian theories of fictional entities, broadly conceived, include 
a set of principles describing the nature of nonexistent objects.31 Purely 
fictional characters are taken to be a subset of the set of nonexistent 
objects. The main claim of Meinongians is that there are objects that do 
not exist. If this formulation sounds contradictory (as the use of italics in 
the last phrase was meant to suggest), it can be reformulated as “some 
objects do not exist.” Meinong is followed in this regard by Terence 
Parsons and Graham Priest, who argue that there is a viable distinction 
between being and existence, and that it is not explicitly contradictory, 
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even though it may sound paradoxical, to affirm that some of the objects 
over which we quantify (by means of expressions of the form “for all,” 
“there is,” and so on) do not have the property of existing. 
The crucial thesis of Meinongian theories is that an object does not 
have to exist in order to instantiate a property. This is a denial of what 
has often been presented as a knock-down objection to the entire ap-
proach, namely, the thesis that existence is a necessary condition on 
having properties.32 Finally, any theory of fictional entities that is to be 
based on the idea of nonexistent objects must hold that the latter can 
play the theoretical role that the former are supposed to play. Support 
for this thesis is needed because even if the idea of nonexistent objects 
can be defended successfully, it does not straightforwardly follow from 
that idea that a subset of these nonexistent entities can be identified 
with the set of fictional characters. 
Meinongians motivate their approach by claiming that nonexistent 
objects are necessary to the general explanation of various linguistic and 
mental data. More specifically, Meinongian metaphysics is said to have 
the advantage of providing an account of intentionality and intensional-
ity.33 To begin with the latter, in one kind of statement about fictional 
characters, intensional verbs are used to postulate a real relation between 
an actual agent and a fictional character. An example is “René Girard 
thinks Meursault is self-deceived.” According to Meinongians, nonex-
istent entities are crucial in accounts of such uses of intensional verbs 
involving fictional characters, the thought being: no relation without 
relata. But how does the Meinongian metaphysics help account for the 
truth conditions of statements belonging to this category? According to 
Priest, we can give an account of the truth of this statement by saying 
that Girard thinks Meursault is self-deceived just in case Meursault, a 
nonexistent object, is in those worlds that describe the sphere of what 
Girard has beliefs about. The key idea here is that nonexistent entities 
can be the referent of empty names and that as a result they can provide 
an explanation of the meaningfulness and truth-value of expressions 
containing this kind of names. 
Turning now to intentionality, we begin with the thought that inten-
tionality is, as Franz Brentano proposed, the “mark of the mental,” or 
at least something essential to our mental states.34 According to many 
philosophers, it is relatively uncontroversial to observe that people fre-
quently think about things that cannot properly be described as being 
part of the actual world (such as what Lord Byron and Percy Bysshe 
Shelley would have done had they lived to a ripe old age), and the 
proposed theoretical justification for believing in nonexistent objects 
is that we can describe intentional mental states of this imaginative 
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sort as being directed towards nonexistent objects. More bluntly put, 
the Meinongian contention is that nonexistent objects play the role of 
fictional intentional objects that do not belong to our world: when we 
think about Rebecca Sharp, we have to be thinking about something, 
and that something is a nonexistent person. 
A question that comes to mind here is this: do Meinongians really ex-
plain the object-directedness of intentionality, or do they merely recruit a 
pervasive assumption about this feature of our experience to ontological 
ends? Perhaps the Meinongians have inverted the order of explanation: 
what explains the illusory “being” of nonexistent objects is human inten-
tionality, which allows us to engage in thoughts and imaginings about 
what does not exist. Perhaps a genuine explanation of this capacity is 
beyond the scope of philosophical analysis; in any case, the “account” 
floated by Meinongians is hardly an explanation in any robust sense. 
As could easily be expected, many philosophers have been quite per-
plexed by the idea that there are things that do not exist. It is regularly 
complained that the distinction between being and existence is not 
perspicuous, and that existence is not straightforwardly interpreted as 
a property on a par with being red or being a bank clerk. Setting these 
and other metaphysical and logical objections aside, for the purpose of 
our discussion it is enough to show that there are problems with the 
identification of a subset of nonexistent objects as the set of items that 
play the role of fictional characters. One important desideratum for any 
theory of fictional characters, we take it, is a convincing account of the 
idea that a fictional characters bears a special relation to the author(s) 
of the work in which that character figures.35 It seems reasonable to 
suppose, for example, that before Fyodor Dostoyevsky thought and 
wrote about Raskolnikov, there was no object to which the name “Ras-
kolnikov” referred. 
However, Meinongian theories of objects imply that there is an infinite 
number of such objects even before any creative act was undertaken by 
any author. Fictional characters, being a species of nonexistent objects, 
are thus an arrangement of properties having a prior being (nonexis-
tence); they are, then, arrangements that some author can select or pick 
out, but not create. What is problematic about Meinongian doctrines 
is that the internal structure of a fictional character remains the same 
whatever the author does, his or her only role being to attribute to the 
selected character the extranuclear property of being fictional or to ap-
pear in this or that novel. This is a very big problem for the doctrine if we 
take seriously the idea that the creators of fictional works are genuinely 
creative. While it would be a mistake to take this latter intuition to en-
tail that authors bring real persons into existence ex nihilo, the account 
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provided by Meinongians is nonetheless highly counterintuitive on this 
point, at least for those who hold that authors do more than “select” a 
character and “make it fictional.”36 
Content and Character
The general arguments about the metaphysics and semantics of fiction 
that we have passed in review leave various more specific questions in 
the background, and it is to some of these that we turn in this section. 
One such question is whether there is a distinction to be drawn between 
fictional entities in general, such as all inanimate objects and settings, 
and fictional characters more specifically. A house can, of course, in a 
supernatural story be represented as having thoughts, feelings, and de-
sires, and so function as a character in that fictional work. Yet in many 
contexts, it makes good critical sense to distinguish between a novelist’s 
description of a house and his or her descriptions of characters. Realists 
about fictional entities could frame our question about the basis of such 
a distinction as a request to identify those properties shared by all and 
only fictional characters. For antirealists, the question can be framed as 
follows: if a fictional character is anything at all, it is part of the contents 
of a work of fiction, or what the fiction is about. One may then ask just 
which parts those might be. 
Philosophers debating the metaphysics of fiction have often had little 
or nothing to say on this topic. Some have defended a broad conception 
whereby the label “fictional characters” covers all objects, things, and 
events as well as persons.37 The distinction alluded to above between 
inanimate objects and characters would be groundless and of no criti-
cal use. A position of this sort has the advantage of not including any 
potentially controversial theses about the nature of agents or persons, 
but this is an advantage purchased at some cost. Such a conception has 
the shortcoming, for example, of implying that certain ongoing debates 
in literary studies are entirely misconceived—such as the debate over 
the relative importance of character analysis in literary criticism, which 
pertains to distinctions that these philosophers deem irrelevant or not 
worth drawing in the first place.38 It also entails that the number of 
characters in even the simplest fictions “explodes.” At the other extreme, 
the term “character” is reserved for representations of persons, given 
some more or less stringent conception of personhood (and some of the 
philosophical conceptions are indeed so stringent that they would rule 
that some of the human beings represented in fictions are not persons).39 
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An alternative to these two approaches is to think of characters as 
represented agents, where agents are beings capable of performing inten-
tional actions.40 This minimalist proposal allows us to acknowledge that 
some nonhuman entities in fiction are represented as having humanlike 
qualities and can thus be conceived of as characters; it has the merit 
of ruling out the nut Krakatuk in E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Nußknacker und 
Mauseköning, while ruling in the intelligent and rebellious appliances in 
Stanislaw Lem’s “Washing Machine Tragedy.”41 This proposal also has 
the merit of neutrality with regard to ongoing disputes in psychology 
and philosophy regarding the status of personality theory.42 
Very briefly, the debate in question concerns the explanatory value of 
attributing personality structures or character traits to individual human 
beings. The personality theorist argues that it is cogent to explain a per-
son’s dishonest actions, for example, by referring to a trait or disposition 
that is a long-standing feature of that individual’s personality. This is, in 
other words, the psychologist’s correlative to the moral philosopher’s 
discourse of vices and virtues. The situationist, on the other hand, thinks 
that the behavior in question could be better explained by referring 
to those aspects of the situation that somehow prompted or elicited a 
dishonest action. Situationists and other social psychologists speak of an 
“attribution error” whereby people explain their own actions in terms 
of flexible responses to contexts and situations, while trying to explain 
the deeds of others by attributing to them (and herein lies the error) 
long-standing dispositions or character traits. Armed with this result, 
situationists complain that many works of fiction perpetuate the kind 
of erroneous thinking that is characteristic of personality theory: the 
novelist shows us a character who is explicable uniquely in terms of a 
“ruling passion” or some such, and we are invited to extend this kind of 
thinking to human beings in the real world. Yet the personality theorist 
and the virtue ethicist respond to this entire line of reasoning by saying 
that the ancient way of talking about character and action is not, in fact, 
erroneous, and that moral character, both within and without fiction, is 
at once real and of explanatory and moral import. 
We cannot pursue the debate between these contrasting views in this 
context. Instead, we want to point out that, even if it were established 
that the explanatory value of character traits has been vastly overrated by 
personality theorists and the discourse of moral psychology more gener-
ally, as situationists have argued, this finding would remain orthogonal 
to the question of how agency has been represented in fictions, unless 
one is in a hurry to assign cognitive value (or the lack thereof) to fictional 
characterizations. Consider, for example, a possible situationist’s con-
tention that Thackeray’s characterization of Rebecca Sharp is somehow 
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faulty because her multiple deceptions and misdeeds are not sufficiently 
linked to the influence of her situation. This could be right, but it does 
not follow that the literary work is bad as a result. While works of fiction 
can be mined for their psychological insights, this sort of cognitive payoff 
is but one of the values of literature, and a work lacking such insights 
may have other qualities worthy of our attention. 
Another question that has been explored by philosophers as well 
as literary critics is whether every narrative work of fiction has at least 
one narrator.43 In cases where there is a narrator, it can also be asked 
whether this figure should be counted amongst the characters in the 
fiction. There are reasons why one might think so, at least if we assume 
that characters are part of the fiction’s content—the part in which 
agents and their doings are represented. One such doing is telling or 
recounting, and any figure represented as doing such things qualifies 
as a character in the story. Some such content is explicit, as in the many 
long embedded narratives in Charles Sorel’s Histoire comique de Francion. 
Yet the characterization of the storyteller is sometimes largely or entirely 
implicit. As a storyteller’s voice or writerly style always represents aspects 
of his or her agency (for example, in the manner of choosing phrases 
and points of view), we may conclude that all narrators are characters. 
(Although we do not have space to pursue the topic here, an analogous 
reasoning extends to implicit readers or auditors, as when Marcel Proust’s 
narrator anticipates and responds to an objection that Monsieur le lecteur 
addresses to Monsieur l’auteur.44) 
It does not follow from this argument that the characterization of the 
narrator is necessarily coherent or plausible. Consider the narrator of 
Vanity Fair, whose statements and quotations tend to convey a seemingly 
authorial perspective on the various agents’ antics. One is not inclined 
to think of this narrator as one of the characters until reading a pas-
sage in chapter 62, where the narrator tells us: “It was on this very tour 
that I, the present writer of a history of which every word is true, had 
the pleasure to see them first, and to make their acquaintance.” If the 
narrator is a person in the story, that is, someone capable of meeting 
and talking to Becky and the others, then how could this same narrator 
be omniscient, or in a position to know that every word about Becky’s 
private thoughts is true? One conclusion that could be drawn is that it 
is true in Thackeray’s fiction that his narrator is an impossible agent, a 
bit like a time traveler who visits his hometown prior to his own birth 
and prevents his mother from giving birth to him. 
Another question about the basic constitution of the cast of characters 
is raised by the fictioneer’s actual or apparent reference to real persons. 
Is it appropriate to apply the designation “fictional characters” to such 
355philosophical perspectives on fictional characters
figures? For example, in Alexandre Dumas’s play of 1853, La jeunesse de 
Louis XIV, Molière serves as the young Louis’s secret agent in a variety 
of courtly intrigues involving Mazarin and his niece. It is tempting to 
argue that either Dumas’s play is a work of fiction having no fictional 
characters, or that it is a work of fiction, the primary characters of which 
are all historical figures familiar to the author and his initial audience. 
While some members of that audience may have had no firm opinions 
regarding Molière and his relations with Louis XIV, those who were 
somewhat well-informed about seventeenth-century France and the life 
of Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, whose nom de plume was Molière, would prob-
ably have doubted, and with good reason, that the ambitious dramatist 
was involved in any of the intrigues that make up the action of the play. 
Such beliefs, however, presumably did not prevent them from engaging 
imaginatively with the contents of the fiction. In fact, with regard to this 
and many kindred examples, the prescribed imaginative attitude involves 
comparisons between the content of one’s relevant beliefs (about histori-
cal figures as well as characters in earlier works) and the contents one is 
being invited to imagine. Some of what is believed or known about the 
historical figure carries over into one’s understanding of the fictional 
character bearing the same name, but other such beliefs do not. 
Similarly, in appreciating a cinematic adaptation of a well-known liter-
ary work, one actively compares the work’s Rebecca Sharp character to 
the characterization bearing that name in the source work, sometimes 
decrying, sometimes rejoicing in, the differences and similarities. This is 
part of what it means to appreciate the adaptation as an adaptation, so 
that one’s appreciative experience of the works is a complicated blend 
of imaginative engagement and metafictional reflection.
Conclusion
In the place of a recapitulation of points from our descriptive survey, 
we propose the following concise formulation of our own understanding 
of the key problems and of our preferred approach to their solution. 
We deny, contra the Meinongian line, that fictional entities are best 
thought of as nonexistents that have some special mode of being called 
“subsistence.” Although such postulations would certainly provide the 
sought-after truth-makers for fictional discourse, they themselves would 
appear to stand in need of plausible truth-makers. For similar reasons, 
we do not find it promising to try to explain the referential function of 
fictional discourse in terms of worlds furnished by either concrete or 
abstract possible entities, at least if talk of fictional worlds is supposed 
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to be more than loose and metaphorical. More generally, in this regard 
we follow Roman Ingarden and Amie Thomasson in espousing the as-
sumption that the grounds of fictional discourse are quite complex. 
 A first such basis is the creative human capacity known traditionally as 
the imagination. Irrealists are right to identify imagining as the distinc-
tive type of mental attitude and process that opens the door to fiction, 
just as the artifact theorist is right to think of works of fiction and their 
contents as the result of human creativity. To create a work of fiction is 
to engage in a specific train of imaginings and subsequently to create a 
prop of some kind, such as a text or an audiovisual display, that can serve 
to invite others to engage in similar imaginative experiences. A good 
philosophical account of how a work of fiction can be created begins 
with the assumption that human beings have the capacity to engage 
in imaginings having determinate content, but it does not follow that 
philosophy can or need provide any deeper explanation of how this is 
possible. Works of fiction are created only if agents use their imagina-
tions in certain kinds of ways and end up endowing the work with a 
determinate content, where the term “content” refers to what is to be 
imagined in engaging appreciatively with the work qua work of fiction. 
The determinate content of a work of fiction owes its existence, then, to 
the imaginative process or act, and this is what grounds the truth-values 
of such statements as Rebecca Sharp is a fictional character, while also 
justifying the seemingly contrasting contentions that Rebecca Sharp 
does not exist, and that she has a lot of musical talent. While the act of 
imagining a particular train of thoughts is real, what those thoughts are 
about can, but need not, be anything actual or possible. 
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